Mediation currently plays a minor role in the Irish family justice system, yet a policy consensus exists that more couples should be encouraged to mediate and that increased rates of mediation will reduce the numbers seeking redress through the courts. The recently published Mediation Act 2017 adopts this position, assuming that the provision of information on mediation will increase uptake and that mediation offers an alternative to litigation for most civil disputes. This article reviews attempts in Ireland, England and Wales to encourage family disputants to mediate, identifying weaknesses in the information strategy. It also examines the legal framework governing all-issues divorce and dissolution in Ireland, pointing to the limited potential for mediation to act as an alternative to litigation.
Introduction
Mediation has formed part of the legal framework governing all-issues separation and divorce in Ireland since 1989 and family mediation services have been provided free of charge by the state since 1986 (Conneely, 2002, p.1) . Nonetheless, uptake of mediation among family law disputants remains low. Just over 1,500 couples attended first mediation appointments with the state-funded Family Mediation Service in 2015 (Legal Aid Board, 2015, p. 34) . A further 1,603 individuals attended a court based mediation session (Legal Aid Board, 2015, p. 34) . To put these statistics in perspective, the Courts Service Annual report for 2015 records a total of 5,852 marriage law applications, and 29,582 additional general family law applications, excluding those relating to domestic violence (Courts Service, 2016, pp. 44-46) . There are no available statistics for private family mediation and in the absence of specific Irish research mapping pathways through the family justice system the extent to which couples engage with mediation outside state provision is unclear, but it seems likely that, as in other jurisdictions where mediation is optional, it is a relatively small part of the family dispute resolution process (Barlow, Hunter, Smithson & Ewing, 2014, p. 6; Bastard, 2010, p. 139) .
This limited engagement with mediation is seen as problematic by policymakers and commentators who conceptualise mediation as an alternative dispute resolution process with the capacity to direct potential litigants away from lawyers and the courts (Coulter, 2009, p. 119; Conneely, 2002, p. 87) . Introducing a Mediation Bill, which applies to most Civil Disputes, to the Dáil in 2017, the Minster for Justice and Equality identified its objective as the promotion of mediation as 'a viable, effective and efficient alternative to court proceedings.' 1 The presumed advantages of mediation in family disputes are well documented, but as noted by Hazel Genn, these benefits are generally expressed in opposition to the disadvantages of litigation (Genn, 2010, p. 196) giving rise to the now entrenched policy assumption that mediation is an alternative to lawyers and litigation. For
example, the Law Reform Commission in its 2008 Consultation Paper on Alternative Dispute
Resolution refers to mediation fostering co-operation, autonomy, cost savings, durable agreements and privacy in contrast to the legal process which creates friction, professional control, higher costs, less durable solutions and less privacy (Law Reform Commission, 2008, pp. 175-176) .
Policy efforts to increase the uptake of mediation in family disputes have focused on the targeted provision of information on mediation and its advantages to potential litigants.
The Law Reform Commission In its 2010 report on Alternative Dispute resolution, noting that mediation is 'underutilised in this jurisdiction in resolving appropriate family law disputes' (Law Reform Commission, 2010, p. 106) , recommended mandatory mediation information sessions for intending family law litigants as a way to increase participation (Law Reform Commission, 2010, p. 108) . Reflecting this recommendation, the Minister for
Justice and Equality announced in 2016 that a forthcoming Mediation Bill would require parties wishing to initiate legal proceedings in family law matters to attend a meeting where they would be provided with information on mediation and its advantages. 2 The Mediation Act 2017 rows back from this commitment, instead making reference, at section 23, to a scheme for delivery of (non-mandatory) sessions to family law disputants which may include provision for information on 'the benefits of mediation over court-based resolutions in respect of the relevant dispute.' In addition, section 14 provides that a solicitors acting for the applicant in a civil dispute must 'advise the client to consider mediation as a means of attempting to resolve the dispute' and provide them with information about the 'advantages of resolving the dispute otherwise than by way of the proposed proceedings.'
Some family disputes were removed from the application of this section at Committee stage in favour of an amendment to similar, less directive, obligations imposed on advising solicitors by the Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act 1989, the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996 and the Guardianship of Infants Act 1965. These provisions require solicitors acting in the taking or defending of proceedings under those Acts to discuss with their client the possibility of engaging in mediation to resolve their dispute. The committee stage amendment to the 2017 Act will also require solicitors to provide information in relation to the confidentiality of mediation, the enforceability of agreements and to complete a statutory declaration confirming the information was provided. Section 14 of the 2017 Act, however, remains applicable to child and spousal maintenance disputes.
Information meetings may have been largely abandoned, but the obligation on solicitors to promote mediation has been re-enforced.
The rationale for the dilution of the mandatory information proposals in the 2017
Act is not clear, but it seems likely that considerations around the cost and practicalities of delivering information sessions to more than 35,000 family law applicants per year were significant factors (Courts Service, 2016, pp. 43-48) . There are currently no court fees for family law applications and it would be politically difficult to introduce a charge for a mandatory element of the family justice system. The full cost of mandatory mediation would therefore fall on the state. Further, there are just 202 available and registered family mediators in Ireland, many of whom are already employed by, or contracted to, the Family Mediation Service. 3 A significant increase in the number of trained family mediators would be necessary to meet demand for mandatory sessions. Nonetheless, the 2017 Act demonstrates the extent to which government policy continues to conceptualise mediation as an alternative to litigation and information provision prior to the issue of court proceedings as an effective way to divert more litigants away from the courts and into mediation. The Legal Aid Board, the largest provider of family legal services in the state, has a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between mediation and litigation, referring to mediation as an alternative to 'contested court cases' and to the potential for 'synergising' the board's legal and mediation services (Legal Aid Board, 2016, p.13) .
Nonetheless, little has been done to articulate this understanding in practice and the Board, like the government, continues to pursue a policy of increasing participation in mediation outside the framework of litigation and legal advice through the provision of information on the advantages of mediation.
This article aims, in the context of Irish all-issues divorce disputes, 4 to challenge the proposition that provision of information on mediation will encourage more people to mediate and the assumption that mediation can provide an alternative to litigation. First, it reviews experiences with information provision in Ireland, England and Wales which demonstrate that providing information on mediation to family disputants does not lead to a meaningful increase in uptake. Second, it outlines how the shape of Irish divorce law makes it almost impossible for mediation to act as a substitute for lawyers and litigation, even where spouses are willing to both mediate and to reach agreement. In conclusion, it suggests that policymakers need to adopt a more nuanced and realistic understanding of the potential role of mediation in supporting dispute resolution for all-issues divorce cases.
Providing Information on mediation -Ireland, England and Wales
The Irish Legal Aid Board provides publically subsidised legal advice and assistance on a means tested basis, principally through its national network of directly employed solicitors, and is the largest provider of family law services in Ireland. It currently operates pilot schemes at some of its centres requiring those seeking legal assistance in certain family law matters to attend a mediation information meeting before being issued with a legal aid certificate. Potential clients presenting themselves at law centres are sent to an information session with a mediator and must return with a certificate of attendance in order to progress their case. The pilots have had limited success in diverting clients to mediation. For example in Cork, 176 information sessions were held in 2015 but just 42 first joint mediation sessions were attended with 33 agreements reached (Legal Aid Board, 2016, pp, 38-39 (Bevan, 1999, p., 411) . Whilst the s 29 requirement did have an impact on the number of cases referred to mediation, in his evaluation of the pilots, Gwynn Davis noted that there had been no corresponding fall in the number of legal aid certificates issued (Davis, 2001, p. 371) . By way of explanation, Bevan and Davis suggest that the availability of publically funded mediation may have 'sucked in' cases not otherwise requiring significant legal input (Davis & Bevan, 2002, p. 177) . As there is a large demand for family legal services, the system will continue to process cases to its full capacity. The numbers redirected to mediation would need to be substantial to have any impact upon this demand. In addition, for cases where mediation was used and a legal aid certificate subsequently issued 'the impact of mediation on legal costs was not significantly different from zero' (Davis, 2001, p. 14) . Davis also found that those compelled to attend a meeting were less enthusiastic about mediation than those who attended voluntarily, that many of those who attended meetings remained unclear about what was being offered, and that as a general proposition mandatory referral to mediation at the point of seeking legal help is not an effective means of securing a legal settlement (Davis, 2001, p.19) .
Questions regarding the efficacy of information provision were also raised by pilots of section 8 of the Family Law 1996 Act. As enacted (the section has since been repealed), section 8 required applicants to attend an information meeting during the three months prior to petitioning for divorce. A respondent seeking ancillary orders in relation to finance or children was also required to attend a meeting. The information to be provided was specified in the Act and included the availability of counselling, the importance of children's welfare, and availability of legal advice, legal aid and 'mediation' (section 8(9)).
Part of the pilot's objective was to determine the most effective way to deliver the necessary information and it was not conducted with a view to 'selling' any particular approach to dispute resolution (Walker, 2001, p. 413) . Nonetheless, success in directing attendees at information meetings to mediation became one of the measures by which the success of the pilot project was measured. In 1,800 follow-up telephone interviews with information meeting attendees five to seven months after attendance just seven percent had used a mediation service since attending the meeting, and a portion of these had only attended one mediation session. One in three indicated that they might attend mediation in the future, but the majority of those interviewed indicated that they had no intention of going to mediation (Walker, 2001, p. 414) . The reasons people gave for not trying mediation were varied, but generally very practical, such as a spouse's refusal to attend, fear of intimidation or that it was just not necessary. The report concluded that '[c]learly, information meetings did not divert people into mediation in any major way.' (Walker, 2001, p. 431) .
Despite the results of these pilot schemes, section 29 of the 1996 Act was re-enacted The former group are required to attend a MIAM in any event, the latter are not, and will receive publically funded legal assistance subject to compliance with relevant assessment rules. Thus, neither direct compulsion by the pre-application protocol (subsequently given statutory force by section 10 of the Children and Families Act 2014), nor indirect pressure via LASPO has resulted in increased attendance at MIAMs or mediation (Hunter, 2017, p. 190; Barlow et al, 2017, p. 78) .
Recent qualitative research by Barlow, Smithson, Hunter and Ewing endorses the view that the drop in information meeting attendance following LASPO was the result of legal aid cuts, noting that individuals in dispute with their former partner or spouse conceptualise their difficulty as a legal one and see solicitors as the appropriate professionals to consult (Barlow, et al, 2014, p. 5; Barlow et al, 2017, p. 78 and 2011 sought no legal advice in relation to their situation and 1% went directly to mediation (Barlow et al, 2014, p. 4) . Lack of knowledge cannot therefore provide a complete explanation for failure to attend; 65% of the target group knew about mediation whilst only 1% actively used it. Among those offered mediation who did not take it up, Barlow et al report the most common reasons as an ex-partners refusal to co-operate, inability to communicate with an ex and fear of violence and abuse (Barlow et al, 2014, p, 6) . Individual family members may at times behave 'irrationally,' may not consider, or may reject mediation for spurious reasons. Nonetheless, even when presented with no alternative, many people have very valid reasons for rejecting mediation for their particular dispute. As mediation information sessions are often conflated with mediation in the minds of the public, similar considerations will stop them volunteering to attend free session. In the absence of a specific referral to an information session by a legal advisor or court, family disputants, as the experience in England and Wales demonstrates, will often not attend a free information session.
The Irish government's strategy of promoting mediation via solicitors engaged by family disputants has the advantage of ensuring that clients receive at least minimal legal direction before being provided with information on mediation. However, most family litigants, particularly in child custody and maintenance applications, are unrepresented and the system established by the 2017 Act provides no mechanism to provide legal advice or mediation information to these litigants. The existing information system has been in place since 1989 and the limited uptake of mediation among family litigants evidences its inefficacy in promoting mediation. The experience in England and Wales suggests that a more directive approach is similarly unlikely to increase participation in mediation.
Is mediation an alternative to litigation in all-issues divorce/dissolution disputes?
Providing information at the point of entry to the family justice system is thus not an effective way to increase the number of family disputants attempting mediation, but even for those who do attempt it, mediation is not an alternative to litigation and lawyers.
Commentators have repeatedly pointed out that mediation cannot entirely replace lawyers and litigation in the family justice system (Barlow et al 2017, 211; Barlow, 2017, p.204; Genn 2010; Hunter 2017; Parkinson, 2013) . Indeed, the removal of legal aid for representation in family law matters in England and Wales has led to a dramatic increase in self-represented clients in the family law courts, not a rush to mediation (Hunter 2017; 198) . The mediation industry in that jurisdiction has framed this outcome as a failure by government and lawyers to change a litigation focused culture. Rosemary Hunter, on the other hand, characterises the continued promotion of mediation as a failure to apply the logic of the market to mediation services; consumers remain indifferent to the 'brand' of mediation, yet government continues to prop up the sector (Hunter 2017; 199) . In context of Irish all-issues divorce law, the lack of interest in mediation is not only a matter of government policy clashing with consumer choice. Mediation cannot replace litigation as a dispute resolution process because, by and large, the legal framework governing divorce and judicial separation requires court-based resolution of disputes.
Irish law did not substantively address the issue of marriage breakdown until 1989
and the form of judicial separation legislation introduced then, and largely reproduced in the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996, reflects political concerns to save marriage, or where that is not possible, to continue its obligations beyond dissolution rather than to facilitate post-relationship life (McGowan, 2016, p. 313) . The grant of a decree of divorce is made contingent, both constitutionally and legislatively, upon meeting three pre-requisites; a four year period of separation, proof that there is no prospect of reconciliation between the spouses, and 'proper provision' being made for the spouses and any dependent children.
Proper provision is to be ensured through ancillary relief orders, but the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996 does not set out any over-riding policy objective for proper provision and despite having had ample opportunity to do so, the courts have not developed specific guiding principles (Crowley, 2011, p. 233; Berkery, 2017, p.16; O'Sullivan 2016a, p.112) creating what Louise Crowley describes as 'an unguided regime of boundless possibilities' (Crowley, 2011, p. 238) . The opacity of the proper provision requirement is exacerbated by the in camera rule which requires all family law proceeding to be held in private. Although the rule has been relaxed recently to allow limited reporting by accredited researchers and journalists, it remains very difficult to ascertain judicial attitudes to ancillary relief on divorce. 5 Most divorces are granted by the Circuit Court where it is not customary to issue written judgments leaving decisions of the High Court in so-called 'ample resources' cases as the only authoritative guidance available. Adjudicating rights and responsibilities where assets outstrip needs is a very different process to that necessary in ordinary families where resources are limited. In any event, the judiciary in deciding these cases have largely replicated the legislative emphasis on flexibility and discretion (Crowley, 2011, p. 233 ).
The level of discretion and apparent inconsistency of judicial decision making in assets or other unique characteristics that make them attractive to media outlets. Cases in which the parties were satisfied with the court's ruling or where a settlement was reached through solicitor negotiation are unlikely to receive media attention or be the subject of written judgments (Healy, 2015, p. 182 argued, is not imposed from above, rather divorce law provides a framework within which couples can determine their post-relationship rights and responsibilities as empowered individuals (Mnookin & Kornhauser, 1979, p. 950) . The extreme levels of discretion and shroud of secrecy surrounding judicial decision making in Irish divorce law certainly cast shadows, but not of a kind that might create a framework for private ordering. (Barlow et al, 2017, p 133-134) .
Even where spouses can negotiate terms, the governing legislation and relevant court rules do not facilitate administrative divorce, meaning that all applications for a divorce require the issue and service of proceedings, the exchange of full financial information and pleadings and attendance by the applicant in court. 6 Although there is some evidence that a full assessment of the extent to which the 'proper provision' requirement has been met is not always undertaken in consent cases (Coulter, 2009, p. 39; Buckley, 2007, p. 63; O'Shea 2013, p. 92) , it is both a constitutional and legislative prerequisite to divorce. Expecting the court to accept a mediated agreement as the basis of a consent order, particularly where no legal advice was provided during mediation, runs contrary to both the specific terms and general tenor of the governing legislation. Whilst the paternalistic approach of the law as its stands is open to criticism, there is an obvious contradiction between the expectation that spouses are autonomous individuals capable of negotiating the end of their relationship outside the law and the requirements of the legal framework which vests a broad discretionary power in the judiciary to oversee and potentially radically vary any agreement reached. Additionally, mediation is of little benefit to spouses who do not have any assets or children and do not need to apply for ancillary relief. Divorce legislation assumes a very specific type of income earning, property owning family where one spouse may potentially be left financially vulnerable following marriage breakdown. Proper provision is intended as a guard against post-relationship poverty, but for families already living in poverty it is of little assistance. If there are no children, or the parties are agreed in relation to child-related issues, there is nothing further to agree and mediation is unnecessary. This cohort of people must nonetheless apply to the court for an order if they want a divorce; mediation cannot assist them in any meaningful way.
Private ordering also has limitations for those seeking to negotiate the end of a marriage before they are eligible to apply for divorce. Separation agreements and judicial separations are relatively common in Ireland because of the four year wait period for divorce. A judicial separation can be granted on a number of grounds, both fault and nofault and the structure of the relevant legislation makes it almost inconceivable that parties could reach agreement on the terms of an order without substantial legal assistance. Where application is made within one year of marriage breakdown, it is necessary to demonstrate fault in the form of adultery or unreasonable behaviour by the respondent. Although a respondent can admit alleged facts, or consent to an order on a fault-based ground, the facts relied upon must be put before the court. By definition, a judicial separation cannot be effected by agreement, only granted by the court, and a judicial separation cannot be separating couples, could achieve this objective. As noted above, couples in complete agreement regarding the terms of their divorce still need the actual order and some will self-represent to obtain it. In her observation of 1,087 marriage law cases in the Circuit Court, Roisin O'Shea reported that 22% of litigants were unrepresented (O'Shea, 2013, p. 213) . O'Shea found a consent-order rate of 67% in Circuit family cases and noted that a substantial proportion of these involved lay litigants with little or no assets seeking divorce (O'Shea, 2013, p. 94) . Lucy-Ann Buckley, in her study of solicitor case files completed between 1999 and 2003, and necessarily relating to represented clients, found a consent rate of 60% (Buckley, 2007, p 63) . Research in other jurisdictions has demonstrated that lawyers and court applications do not necessarily represent adversarial attitudes and selfrepresenting litigants are often more adversarial than lawyers (Hunter, 2003; Genn, 2010; Healy, 2015, p. 177) . Lay litigants generally lack the resources or expertise to negotiate settlement terms or conduct a trial efficiently and may be reluctant to engage with the other party's solicitor. Providing legal assistance to unrepresented parties before they reach the court could prove a more effective way to reduce the number of contested divorce cases, and the court time taken up by them, than encouraging mediation before either party has obtained legal advice.
It seems trite to claim that reaching agreement about children, money and property at mediation will not undo the legal ties of marriage. Clearly neither a mediator, nor the parties themselves, can produce an order for divorce or judicial separation; these orders can only be obtained from a court in compliance with constitutional and legislative requirements. This seems obvious, and the point has been made many times before in other jurisdictions (Dingwall, 2010; Dennison, 2010; Maclean & Eekelar, 2016; Hunter, 2003) , but the persistence of political discourse about the advantages of mediation as an alternative to lawyers and litigation mean that it clearly needs to be repeated. There will, of course, always be couples who simply need some assistance with practical matters in order to walk away from a relationship, but the vast majority of people need formal legal recognition of the end of their marriage. Mediation can provide a support to dispute resolution in all-issues divorce cases, but marriage is a law bound institution and its breakdown is subject to comprehensive legal regulation. Given the very public profile of marriage and divorce law reform in Ireland over the last four decades, it is difficult to imagine how spouses experiencing marital difficulties could fail to appreciate the legal quality of their relationship and the need for a court order to end it. The rejection of mediation as a dispute resolution process could be characterised as a consumer choice, but it is a well informed choice, not an advertising-driven preference.
It seems surprising that political discussion surrounding the Mediation Act 2017 made little or no reference to the procedural and practical difficulties surrounding private ordering in family law. This can largely be explained by the scope of the legislation which is intended to provide a framework for resolution of a broad range of civil disputes through mediation, applying to all 'civil proceedings that may be instituted before a court' (section 2(1)). Political focus was very much on commercial disputes which take up significant court time but can be effectively resolved by agreement between the parties. Potential conflicts between existing family law provisions and the Bill were pointed out in a submission made by the Law Society to the Department of Justice and Equality which resulted in some committee stage amendments (Law Society, 2017) . Although the Law Society submission did address wider issues with the Bill's application to family law these were not taken up by
Deputies. As pointed out most recently by Barlow et al, the outcomes of private family disputes have significant societal implications (Barlow et al, 2017) . The complexity and paternalism of Irish substantive and procedural family law is the result of political attempts to address these issues. Unfortunately the promise of family dispute resolution in a conflictfree zone appears to have taken precedence over consideration of the very real constraints of Irish divorce law.
An alternative to mediation v litigation?
Mediation may be inadequate as a complete solution to all-issues divorce disputes, but it undoubtedly has a useful role to play in identifying and resolving issues arising when the interpersonal relationship at the heart of a marriage breaks down. In family law disputes mediation has an important pastoral or welfare role in facilitating improved communication and on-going co-operation between former spouses on financial and child-related issues (Conneely, 2002, p. 16; Law Reform Commission, 2008, p. 175; Barlow, 2017, p. 204; Kelly 2004 ). Irish policy-makers recognise this welfare role; supporting families was the objective of the Family Mediation Service when it was first established in 1986. More recently, government expectations for mediation have shifted to reflect an assumption that it can resolve a significant proportion of family disputes without recourse to law. An over-reliance on this expectation, coupled with a powerful cost saving agenda, led the British government to remove funding for legal aid in most family related disputes in England and Wales. A similar approach does not seem likely Ireland, but the continued focus on mediation as an alternative to litigation means that no realistic attempt has been made to harness the benefits of mediation for couples and families who must engage with all-issues divorce law.
The Mediation Act 2017, with its emphasis on increasing uptake of mediation through information provision, does little to support innovation in dispute resolution services. Family law disputes are conflated with ordinary civil disputes in the Act evidencing a failure to consider the unique constitutional and legislative framework governing marriage and its breakdown and the extent to which it precludes private ordering. Further, the Act refers, at section 2(2) to the 'desirability of resolving, in so far as practicable, disputes, within a family…in a manner that is non-adversarial, and the need for the expeditious resolution of such disputes in a manner that minimises the costs of resolving those disputes.' This is a noble aim, but offering information on mediation as an alternative to lawyers and litigation will not achieve it within the existing Constitutional and legislative framework.
Kathyrn O'Sullivan suggests that a more rule based approach to ancillary relief on divorce would produce judicial consistency which would in turn facilitate more private bargaining (O'Sullivan, 2016a, p. 118) . Consistency in decision making is a worthwhile objective and the existing legal framework undoubtedly makes both private ordering and self-representation problematic. Nonetheless, as the experience in other jurisdictions demonstrates, mediation is not a universal panacea. Some cases will never be suitable for mediation, particularly those involving domestic violence or child protection issues, or where the level of conflict precludes the potential for an agreed approach to dispute resolution. Even where spouses can reach agreement on all issues a mediated agreement, of itself, will not sever the legal ties of marriage. Whichever legal framework applies, mediation can have benefits for disputing family members (Kelly, 2004) but it needs to be understood as an additional dispute resolution process, not an alternative to lawyers and litigation.
